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We present a framework for Results Based Management (RBM) of commercial fisheries. The 
core idea of RBM is to reduce micro-management by delegating management responsibility 
to resource users. The RBM framework represents an industrial organization approach to co-
management and comprises three defining processes, conducted by three independent 
“agents”: 1) an “authority” defines specific and measurable and achievable objectives 
(outcome targets, OTs) for the utilization of fisheries resources, 2) resource user organizations 
(termed “operators”) take responsibility for achieving these OTs and provide documentation 
that 3) allows independent “auditors” to evaluate the achievement of OTs. Using incentive 
mechanisms, notably deregulation, RBM grants operators the flexibility to develop and 
implement innovative and cost-effective ways to achieve OTs. The feasibility of 
implementing RBM in five European fisheries was investigated in cooperation with relevant 
stakeholders through artificial planning processes and computer simulations. The operators 
involved were enthusiastic, and new management plans were drafted based on the framework. 
These included socio-economic OTs in addition to traditional stock objectives, encompassing 
an ecosystem approach. Several issues are in need of further research in order to consolidate 
the approach and prepare the ground for practical implementation, including: the specification 
of the legal and regulatory framework required to underpin RBM, details of transitional 
arrangements when shifting towards RBM (including cost-sharing) and the development of 
necessary organizational capacity for operators. Initially, we therefore envisage the 
framework being applied to high value single species fisheries, with a limited number of 
participants, which are adequately represented by a competent organization.   
Keywords: Burden of proof, co-management, Common Fisheries Policy, results based 
management, the EcoFishMan project. 
 
1. Introduction 
Many marine fisheries suffered from the ‘Tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) as they 
became overexploited in the 20th century (Worm et al., 2006), largely due to rapid 
industrialisation, capitalisation and poor management (Caddy and Cochrane, 2001). In 
response, a centralised fisheries management approach was consolidated by the New Ocean 




its Exclusive Economic Zone, with international collaborative management for straddling and 
migratory stocks (Dyke, 1995). This approach has begun to succeed in certain regional seas 
(Worm et al., 2009; Fernandes and Cook, 2013; Cardinale et al., 2013), but requires 
significant investments in compliance measures, regulation and monitoring. Such investments 
are typically covered by public funds and represent indirect subsidies (Shrank et al., 2003; 
Sumaila et al., 2007) and where they are insufficient, stocks continue to be overexploited 
(Worm et al., 2009; Costello et al., 2012;Fernandes et al. 2017).  
This state-centred approach tends to lead to paternalistic (top-down) and regulation intensive 
management systems that exclude resource users from knowledge production and decision-
making (Lane and Stephenson, 2000; Degnbol, 2003; Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2003). This 
contrasts with the growing recognition that successful management of fisheries and other 
socio-ecological systems must include the constructive engagement of users (Lane and 
Stephenson, 2000; Degnbol, 2003; Parma et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2009; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; 
Deacon, 2012). The strategy of assigning management responsibility to user groups within a 
formalised management systems is not new (Jentoft, 1989) and has shown promise in some  
cases, but receives little attention (Deacon, 2012). There is little general discussion on how to 
design a framework for an ‘industrial organization’ approach to co-management with 
relevance to modern capture fisheries (Lane and Stephenson, 1998).  
Aiming to reinvigorate discussion, promote research and devise practical initiatives in this 
context, we present and discuss a specific approach which aims to delegate fisheries 
management responsibility to resource users. The conceptual basis for the proposed approach 
is Results Based Management (RBM), combined with incentive mechanisms for stimulating  
active involvement of user groups in management and information gathering, namely the 
notions of a “reversed burden of proof” (Degnbol, 2003; Fitzpatrick et al. 2011; Linke and 
Jentoft, 2012) and “cost recovery” (Stokes et al., 2006). This is based on the idea that private 
users of public resources should be held accountable for the costs of implementing 
management measures and of monitoring to ensure that the negative impact of the resource 
use is acceptable.  
Aligned with New Public Management ideas (Rhodes, 1996), RBM has guided reforms in 
national and international organizations, including UN agencies, the OECD and the World 




idea of RBM is to delegate responsibility for achieving defined results to a user level. The 
European Commission (EC) expressed this idea as follows:   
The industry can be given more responsibility through self-management. […] instead 
of establishing rules about how to fish, the rules focus on the outcome and the more 
detailed implementation decisions would be left to the industry. Public authorities 
would set the limits within which the industry must operate, […] and then give 
industry the authority to develop the best solutions economically and technically (EC, 
2009). 
The proposed framework for RBM was developed in an EC funded research project. The 
main deficiencies that the framework aimed to address were the structural problems of the 
EC’s previous Common Fisheries Policy (CFP): a top-down and micro-management approach 
with insufficient opportunities for industry involvement, imprecise policy objectives, a short-
term focus, and poor compliance (EC, 2009). RBM shifts the burden of proof, and delegates 
responsibility for planning and implementing management measures to organised resource 
user groups, the “operators”. Relevant “authorities” still define policy goals for the public’s 
natural resources, but it is left to operators to develop workable management plans and to 
provide the information necessary for “auditors” to conduct an independent audit of the extent 
to which the goals are met. The policy goals are made explicit through the definition of 
outcome targets (OTs) which are specific, measurable, and achievable objectives defined by 
the authority in consultation with operators.   
The management of rock lobsters (Jasus edwardsii, Palinuridae and Sagmariasus verreauxi, 
Palinuridae) in New Zealand (Yandle et al., 2011) is regarded as an advanced example of 
RBM arrangements in fisheries on an organisational scale (Nielsen et al., 2015), as opposed 
to the scale of individual fishers or vessels (Fitzpatrick et al., 2011). Secure harvest rights 
created incentives for quota holders to rebuild resources to levels with higher productivity and 
profitability (Miller and Breen, 2010). In addition, a cost-recovery regime encouraged the 
industry to enhance the cost-effectiveness of management and research (Stokes et al., 2006). 
While the statutory requirement is that stock biomasses should be at, or above, levels that 
support Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), industry harvest strategies in some cases aim to 




the industry refrained from harvesting its full allocation in order to build stocks up to more 
profitable levels (Breen et al., 2009; Miller and Breen, 2010).  
Taking inspiration from this and other relevant cases (Dixon and Sloan, 2007; James, 2008; 
Featherstone and Rogers, 2008; see also cases referred to in section 2), RBM is proposed as 
an ideal type (Cahnman, 1965) of an industrial organization approach to co-management. In 
this paper, we describe an RBM framework and study its potential application in pilot studies 
of four European fisheries. To invoke change, such as that proposed here with RBM, the 
framework must be adapted to a given governance setting and build on the institutions and 
organisations already in place. In our conclusion, we consider the prospects of moving 
towards RBM arrangements and identify issues in need of further research in order to refine 
and consolidate the proposed approach. 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
Previously, Nielsen et al. (2015) developed an RBM prototype, based on relevant RBM 
literature (EC, 2009; Fitzpatrick, 2011), fisheries management systems with RBM aspects 
(Lane and Stephenson, 2000; Molares and Freire, 2003; Townsend and Shotton, 2008; Yang 
et al., 2010; Zacharin et al., 2008; Deacon, 2012; Yang et al., 2014), and advice from 
stakeholders and fishery managers in New Zealand and Europe. The initial prototype outlined 
a process for developing, approving and evaluating a Management Plan (MP), and specified 
the generic division of labour and manner of cooperation between the associated agents. The 
prototype was applied to pilot case studies in a series of artificial planning processes as 
described below (Section 2.3). An evaluation of these processes provided a basis for 
extending and adapting further prototypes, which were subsequently applied and evaluated in 
a similar process. In the following section, we briefly present basic conditions that facilitate 
implementation of RBM (section 2.1) before presenting the final prototype (section 2.2).  
  
2.1 Enabling conditions for an industrial organization approach to co-management 
With top-down management as the starting point, a move towards co-management will 
necessarily proceed from institutionally unfavourable conditions (Jentoft, 1989). Pomeroy and 




The role of government is crucial with regard to establishing a legal framework that enables 
an effective and transparent delegation of responsibility to resource users. While the legal 
basis underpinning the proposed RBM is considered beyond the scope of this work, we draw 
attention to four essential aspects. First, membership of authorised resource user organisations 
should be mandatory as incomplete organisational representation will reduce the ability for 
resource user organisations to decide on comprehensive management actions. Second, 
resource user organisations must be able to make binding decisions on behalf of their 
members through an effective and legitimate decision-making mechanism (Jentoft, 1989; 
Townsend, 2010a, b). Third, as RBM incurs a new practical and financial burden of 
management on users, it must also include strong positive incentives to foster industry 
acceptance. One important incentive in RBM is deregulation, granting operators the flexibility 
to design locally workable management solutions provided that OTs are met. Long-term user 
rights, either held individually or by a group, is likely to represent the most powerful type of 
incentive: promoting long-term sustainability also increases the productivity of the resource, 
and thereby the value of the rights (Grafton et al., 2006; Deacon, 2012). Fourth, resource user 
organisations need to foster leadership, and develop the organisational capacity, know-how 
and the mechanisms for conflict resolution required to take on responsibility for management 
functions. These abilities are typically developed over long time spans, although recent 
experience with the Advisory Councils in Europe have helped (Hegland and Wilson, 2009; 
Stange et al., 2014). 
 
2.2 Framework for Results Based Management in Fisheries 
The RBM (Fig. 1) operationalises RBM through a contract (Townsend, 2010b) between an 
“authority” and one or more “operators”. In practice, this contract is an MP, proposed by the 
operator(s) and approved by the authority. The RBM stipulates a conditional reallocation of 
responsibilities and provides a template for a process that empowers resource users, enhances 
transparency, and enables the use of locally adapted management measures. Representing 
public interests, the basic mandate of the authority is to ensure that its global policy objectives 
are fulfilled. This responsibility is not delegated with RBM. OTs are defined to contribute to 






Fig. 1.  A framework for Results Based Management (RBM) in fisheries. The framework involves 
three agents: i) the authority, a democratically accountable entity responsible for resource 
management. It oversees the RBM processes and issues management plan (MP) invitations, which 
include the specification of measurable and achievable objectives (outcome targets: OTs). It can 
approve or reject operators’ MP proposals; ii) the operator, an organized group of resource users, e.g. 
fishers, with rights in a given fishery. The operator develops, proposes and implements an MP, which 
includes strategies for achieving OTs and for documenting the effectiveness of chosen means; iii) the 
auditor, an independent agent with capacity to audit MP performance. The auditor reviews 
documentation, evaluates the extent to which OTs have been achieved, and submits the audit to the 
authority and operator(s). The system proceeds from left to right starting with the dialogues between 
operators and authority to agree on the involved process. 
 
The performance of an MP is evaluated by a third agent, an external “auditor”, which also 
monitors that both parties stick to pre-agreed timelines and process steps. The auditor 
enhances mutual accountability and reduces the risk of imbalanced relationships between 
cooperating parties. Examples of these are: a lack of downward accountability (Berkes, 2009), 
reduced proclivity of civil servants to defend public interests due to tight cooperation with 
industry (Singleton, 1999), and a reluctance of the authority to delegate power (Moynihan, 
2006).  
The RBM process begins with dialogues between the authority and operator(s) to facilitate a 
shared understanding of goals and expectations. Subsequently, the authority prepares an MP 
invitation, specifying the OTs to be achieved. The authority may arrange a process for 
involving potentially affected interests beyond those of the fisheries sector in the formulation 
of OTs. OTs can only be defined in terms of indicators that operators can be expected to be 




area of responsibility for operators. Beyond the OTs the responsibility to achieve policy goals 
remains with the authority.  
The operator then proposes an MP detailing how OTs will be achieved through a set of 
measures. To do so they need to harness and finance the required technical expertise, 
contracted externally or kept in-house at their own cost. The delegation of responsibility for 
planning and management requires that resource user organisations will employ this expertise, 
just as is the case for authorities in top-down management systems. The MP establishes how 
the fisheries will be monitored, controlled, documented and how and by whom data will be 
analysed. These functions require services that the operator may take upon itself or outsource 
to competent organisations. Finally, the MP identifies audit dates.  
The MP includes (graduated) sanctions in case OTs are not achieved (e.g. a harvest control 
rule with inbuilt catch reductions if biomass thresholds are not met). The presence of such 
collective sanctions may encourage the operator to develop internal control mechanisms in 
order to avoid losses due to non-compliant members. Most likely, however, operators will 
need external control and enforcement (e.g. provided by the authority) to ensure compliance 
and to provide independent information (e.g. regarding the quality of catch data). From the 
perspective of the authority and its commitment to public policies, the issue of control resorts 
simply to whether OTs are achieved. It is for the independent auditor to confirm such 
achievement, on the basis of its evaluation of the appropriate documentation. 
The authority examines the MP proposal, and may request revisions or clarifications until it 
meets pre-agreed conditions, i.e. a strategy for achieving OTs and for obtaining adequate 
audit information. This step could involve a thorough scientific evaluation, e.g. a 
Management Strategy Evaluation (Punt et al., 2017), but a less formalised expert judgment 
process could be used for small scale, low value, or data-poor fisheries. The authority’s 
approval serves to provide a safeguard against poor proposals and does not relieve operators 
of their principal responsibility to achieve OTs.  
Before approving an MP proposal, the authority should arrange a public hearing to promote 
transparency and allow stakeholders other than those affiliated with operators to comment on 
the proposal. Representing public interests, the authority decides whether or not to take this 




The operator is responsible for implementing the MP and for collecting the information 
required for an audit of its performance. As mentioned, it may do so in cooperation with 
relevant hired expertise. Based on the information provided by operators, an appointed auditor 
assesses the extent to which OTs are achieved. To maintain credibility and legitimacy, the 
auditor should be independent of both authority and operators. The audit provides the 
authority with a basis to make decisions: if OTs are met the operator continues with activities 
according to the MP. If not, the authority may request revisions, set stricter requirements, or 
implement pre-agreed sanctions. To enhance transparency, the authority should provide a log 
of key events in the process and make it available externally. As a minimum, the log includes 
the MP invitation and minutes of key meetings, including the MP hearing.  
In the ideal model of RBM presented above, the industry bears the responsibility and costs for 
collection of fisheries data and implementation of management measures. In practice, 
however, it may not always be considered appropriate to confer these costs to the industry 
immediately. Cost sharing arrangements, however, do not preclude that the industry could 
have the formal responsibility for the relevant tasks.  
The MP is subjected to a range of uncertainties and externalities. This implies that operators 
cannot be expected to achieve OTs under all circumstances (e.g. unfavourable environmental 
conditions). This is a common contract situation in which it is impractical, costly or even 
impossible for the contracting parties to address all contingencies ex ante. In general, failure 
to deliver the terms of contracts is addressed ex post by the courts, which determine whether 
the contractor has performed in ‘good faith’ (Burton, 1980; Armour et al., 2009). Similarly in 
RBM, if OTs are not met, the auditor judges whether the operator has implemented the MP in 
‘good faith’, and taken reasonable measures to achieve OTs. This provides the basis for the 
authority to set new conditions when the MP is revised and/or to introduce sanctions. The 
ultimate sanction for operators consistently performing in ‘bad faith’ could be termination of 
the RBM approach, and a consequent re-installment of top-down management.  
 2.3 Pilot studies 
 
It was not possible to study actual implementation of the RBM in fisheries due to several 
reasons. First, this would require that the major outcome of the project, the proposed RBM 




require much more time and support by policy makers and stakeholders than what is normally 
available to a research project. Third, and probably of most significance, the enabling 
conditions for the RBM (described in 2.2) were only partially available in the pilot studies.  
The feasibility of implementing RBM was, therefore, studied through artificial planning 
processes in collaboration with candidate agencies in the respective roles of operators and 
authority. The pilot studies were presented to these agencies as an invitation to participate in a 
study with the aim to develop alternative management arrangements on a voluntary basis. The 
research was organized in accordance with the process outlined above for developing and 
evaluating an MP with the following steps: 
1. An MP invitation was prepared for each pilot study by the relevant authority. The MP 
invitation defined the OTs for resource users to meet. It also contained a guideline for 
developing the MP, and listed the required elements to be addressed.  
2. Responding to the MP invitation, operators developed an MP. The MPs were refined until 
the authority had confirmed that all required elements were in place and thus could approve 
the MP.   
 3. The performance of MPs with regard to OTs was assessed using model simulations. This 
provided a basis for auditors to evaluate MPs regarding sustainability, applicability and risks.  
The respective roles of authority and operators were performed by local relevant actors in the 
pilot studies to the extent possible, and were facilitated by research teams from the project. To 
avoid the risks of ambiguity of roles of researchers (Dankel et al., 2015), the project was 
organised such that teams of project researchers would facilitate one role only, consistent with 
the outlined RBM.  
The pilot study approach faced a number of limitations of which the most significant were: 
 The simulation of the RBM process was limited to the steps of developing and 
evaluating MPs. The subsequent steps of 1) the authority requesting revisions or 
implementing sanctions if OTs were not met and 2) of operators adapting their MPs in 
response were not simulated. These steps need to be implemented and evaluated in 
order to consolidate the RBM approach, but this could not be achieved in a three 




 The simulation approaches differed between pilot studies and could not provide a 
basis for evaluating outcomes of all OTs in some cases. 
 The simulated nature of the pilot studies implies that the expressed attitudes of the 
relevant agents in the pilot studies might have been influenced by the fact that the 
RBM was not implemented in reality. 
The pilot studies were selected to provide a range from simple (single species, single nation) 
to complex (multispecies, multinational) fisheries and management contexts, and to reflect 
variation in the availability and quality of data (Table 1). The Mediterranean pilot study had 
resource constraints which did not permit model simulation, so the evaluation of the 
feasibility of the RBM was limited to a role-play event with participation from relevant local 
user organisations and representatives of national fisheries administrations. This case is not 
considered further here, but information on this, as well as more details on concepts and pilot 
studies (e.g. management plans, associated documentation needs and responsibilities, cost 
sharing arrangements, and feedback from stakeholders) are available in project reports at 
www.ecofishman.eu.   
Table 1.  Overview of pilot studies investigated for the feasibility of RBM. CFP = Common Fisheries 
Policy; GFCM = General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean.  Cases are arranged, from left 
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2.3.1 The Icelandic lumpfish fishery 
The Icelandic lumpfish (Cyclopterus lumpus, Cyclopteridae) gillnet fishery is relatively 
simple in terms of biology and management. Bycatches are limited and catch, effort and 
market statistics are available. However, the fishery is data poor with regard to stock 
assessment. The Marine Research Institute (MRI) estimates stock status based on indices 
from the Icelandic Groundfish Survey and a gillnet survey, which are considered to provide a 
reliable basis for advice (WGLUMP, 2015). Traditionally, only the lumpfish roe is sold, but 
niche markets for the meat have emerged, although these are unstable and involve low profit 
margins. 
The Icelandic Ministry of Industries and Innovation (IMII) manages the fishery in 
consultation with the Marine Research Institute (MRI), the Directorate of Fisheries and the 
industry, considering advice from the MRI, regional needs, and market conditions. There is 
no management plan. The MRI provides advice on Total Allowable Catches (TACs) based on 
fishing mortality (F) reference point proxies, but the fishery is regulated through licenses and 
effort restrictions (MSC, 2016; Kennedy et al., 2015).  
The fishery is of limited importance for the national economy but is of high socio-economic 
importance in many small fishing villages. Participants in the fishery are all members of the 
National Association of Small Boat Owners (NASBO) which represents the entire fishery 
concerning most issues. 
2.3.2 The Icelandic mixed demersal fishery 
This fishery is relatively simple in terms of biology and management, and benefits from high 
data availability. The fishery primarily targets Icelandic stocks of cod, haddock and saithe 
(respectively Gadus morhua, Melanogrammus aeglefinus and Pollachius virens, all from the 
family Gadidae). A harvest control rule was adopted in 2009 for cod and in 2014 for haddock 
and saithe (IF, 2017). The fisheries management authority and the decision-making process 
are as in the previous case.  
The fishery is managed by Individual Transferable Quotas and involves two groups of 
permanent quota entitlements. Group1 consists of about 400 small (<15 m) vessels restricted 
to using hand-line or long-line, accounting for ~14% of the demersal catches. Group2 




catches. The IMII allocates ~2% of the demersal TAC to an open access fishery for ~ 700 
small (<13 m) handline boats. Finally, it allocates ~ 8% of the demersal TAC to facilitate new 
entries into the fishery, or support regional development or environmentally friendly 
initiatives. The latter “incentive quotas”, are primarily utilized by vessels operating within 
Group1 or by small coastal vessels without quotas. Almost all NASBO members are within 
Group1 or own vessels without quotas. Group2 are members of Fisheries Iceland (SFS), 
formerly known as the Federation of Icelandic fishing vessel owners (LIU). 
Operators in the mixed demersal fishery are engaged in shaping management policy. Unlike 
the lumpfish fishery, the cod fishery brings together heterogeneous harvesters that operate 
vessels within different fleet segments, and with potentially diverging fisheries interests. 
Whereas both SFS and NASBO support the current quota management system, those taking 
part in the open access coastal fisheries would like to see it changed. These differences make 
a comprehensive shift towards co-management difficult. 
 
2.3.3 The Portuguese crustacean trawl fishery 
This mixed fishery targets several deepwater crustaceans located on soft sediments on the 
continental slope off the Southwest and South Portuguese coasts at depths > 150 m. The most 
important target species are rose shrimp (Parapenaeus longirostris, Penaeidae) and Norway 
lobster (Nephrops norvegicus, Nephropidae) but red, purple and scarlet shrimps (respectively 
Aristeus antennatus, Aristaeomorpha foliacea and Aristaeopsis edwardsiana, all from the 
family Aristaeidae) are sporadically targeted in specific areas. Significant commercial finfish 
bycatch species include blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou, Gadidae), European hake 
(Merluccius merluccius, Gadidae) and Atlantic horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus, 
Carangidae) (Silva et al., 2009, 2015). 
The fishery is managed under the CFP. The responsibility for implementing the fisheries 
policy at national level lies with the Ministry of the Sea and is delegated to the Deputy State 
Secretary for the Sea. The Portuguese General Directorate for Natural Resources, Safety and 
Marine Services (DGRM) is responsible for fisheries management activities, drafting national 
regulations, distributing quotas, monitoring and enforcement.  
The fishery includes 26 Portuguese trawlers (20-29 m length). In addition, five Spanish 




associations, with 12 Portuguese trawlers represented by the Associação dos Armadores das 
Pescas Industriais (ADAPI); Spanish vessels by the Association de Armadores de Punta del 
Moral (AAPM). The fact that the fishery involves vessels from two different countries, which 
are not subjected to the same set of regulations, may impede progress towards common co-
management arrangements. 
 
2.3.4 North Sea mixed demersal fisheries 
North Sea demersal fisheries involve a number of fleets and species, but are data rich. The 
largest fleets are operated by the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Denmark (STECF, 
2011). The fisheries target valuable species such as cod, haddock, and whiting (Merlangius 
merlangus, Gadidae), but also saithe, plaice (Pleuronectes platessa, Pleuronectidae), sole 
(Solea solea, Soleidae), Norway lobster, European hake and anglerfish (mainly Lophius 
piscatorius, Lophiidae). A revised CFP was implemented in 2014 to improve conservation 
and achieve long-term economic viability for the fishing industry (EU, 2013).The reform 
includes a landing obligation (discard ban) which presents difficulties in the presence of  
species with small quotas, “choke species”, which may induce a premature closure (Baudron 
and Fernandes, 2014).  
Demersal fisheries in the North Sea feature many nations, fleet types, fishermen’s 
associations and producer organizations, which altogether may render a comprehensive co-
management arrangement difficult. The fishing industry is organized into a number of 
national and international associations and Producer Organizations (POs) (Santiago et al., 
2015). The North Sea Advisory Council (NSAC) is a key arena for stakeholder participation 
in fisheries management, with representatives from the fishing industry organizations as well 
as environmental NGOs. However, its role in participatory governance may be hampered by 
difficulties to provide consensus based advice (Hatchard and Gray, 2014).  
 
3. Results 
Outcomes from the pilot studies are reported with a focus on: description of the agents 
(authority, operator and auditor), OTs, details of the MP, and an assessment of the simulated 




process and outcomes of model simulations indicating if the MP was likely to achieve the 
OTs.  
3.1 The Icelandic lumpfish fishery 
Assisted by a group of project researchers, NASBO was the “operator” and developed the 
MP. The IMII was positive to the pilot study, but did not participate in it. A different group of 
project researchers therefore represented the role of the “authority”. An accredited 
certification body was identified as potential “auditor”, but the audit function was performed 
by a separate research group. 
The Icelandic fisheries management act identifies the key objectives for the management of 
living marine resources in Icelandic waters (IP, 2006). The goals are to promote the 
conservation and efficient utilisation of marine resources and ensure stable employment, 
economic viability and maintain settlement in rural areas. The “authority” and the “operators” 
agreed on two OTs: A biological OT for lumpfish to maintain fishing mortality (Fproxy) < 0.75, 
which is the MSY proxy used by the MRI to provide TAC advice (MSC 2016). A socio-
economic OT was defined which set requirements for the geographical distribution of issued 
licenses due to the regional importance of the fishery. 
An MP was developed in dialogue with various stakeholders. The MP built on existing 
regulations but included new elements, notably that NASBO would be responsible for issuing 
licenses, deciding on annual effort limits, deciding on sanctions, and for monitoring 
compliance. NASBO would obtain the funding necessary for meeting these responsibilities 
through the sale of licenses (currently issued by the Directorate of Fisheries). A significant 
change, agreed by all parties, was an obligation to land the whole fish, not only roe, in order 
to enhance job creation and export value.  
Likely outcomes of implementing the MP were estimated by a computer simulation in 
StellaTM, taking into consideration recruitment, growth rate, harvest rate, effort, costs, 
revenues, profits, the number of jobs in catching and processing, as well as spatial 
considerations regarding landings and job creation (Sigurðardóttir and Gunnlaugsson, 2012). 
The Icelandic lumpfish fishery appeared as a promising case for RBM. Simulations over a 20-
year period indicated that both OTs would be achieved, and that the obligation to land whole 




spatially well defined and little impact on other species or the marine environment. The 
prospects of applying RBM were strengthened by the fact that all operators are members of a 
single organisation, which could act on behalf of the entire fishery. NASBO has an incentive 
to collect additional biological and market data to improve stock assessment, market forecasts 
and control of supply. A main weakness of the pilot study was that the actual authority was 
not involved.   
3.2 The Icelandic mixed demersal fishery 
LIU did not participate in this pilot study, and gave no particular reason. One obvious reason 
could be that LIU is content with the present quota management system. The ITQ system has 
been contested since it came into effect, with initial allocation and transferability of quotas, 
and sharing of the resource rent being especially thorny issues (Matthiasson and Agnarsson, 
2009; Benediktsson and Karlsdottir, 2011; Agnarsson, Matthiasson and Giry, 2016; 
Kokorsch, Karlsdottir and Benediktsson 2016; Chambers and Carothers, 2017). Without LIU, 
the main agents involved were those involved in the previous case, restricting the pilot study 
to smaller jig and line vessels and vessels without quotas, comprising approximately 14-18% 
of total demersal catches.  
Representing almost all vessel owners within this category, NASBO was actively involved as 
the “operator”. Groups of researchers respectively represented the agencies of “authority” and 
“auditor”. The “authority” and NASBO agreed on 19 OTs (of which seven, outlined here in 
italics, were new): spawning stock biomass (SSB) for cod, haddock, saithe, golden redfish, 
Atlantic catfish, tusk and common ling > MSY thresholds; F < FMSY (for eight bycatch 
species); bycatch % limits by species; an obligation to land all catches; 20% of Earnings 
Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) is paid as public resource 
rent; zero non-fuel subsidies; EBITDA of fishing companies > 0 (average for planning 
period); > 17% of demersal TACs for J&L vessels < 15 m; > 80% of catches landed in 
villages with < 5000 inhabitants; company specific ownership of quota < 12%; average 
wages in the sector > national average; annual recruitment of new workers > 1%; all 
primary processing in Iceland. NASBO’s proposal incorporated the “incentive quotas” into 
Group1 and invited vessel-owners without quotas into that system. The MP covered 17% of 
the total demersal catches in Icelandic waters, of which 12% would be allocated based on 
present quota ownership. The remaining 5% would be entrusted to a quota bank operated by 




NASBO committed to the operator role and invested work in developing an MP for the 
identified fishery share, although some of its members did not assent to all OTs. Part of the 
disagreement related to the reallocation of the “incentive quotas” through a quota bank. MRI 
would continue to provide stock information.  
Likely outcomes of implementing the MP for a 10-year period were assessed mainly by 
computer simulation (Sigurðardóttir et al., 2013), but status could be assessed for only nine 
OTs due to data limitations. The performance of the MP could therefore not be evaluated 
fully. The simulations suggested that the biological OTs for cod, haddock, saithe and golden 
redfish were likely to be achieved, but as the MP only covered 17% of the fishery, the 
achievement of biological OTs would be driven by the fisheries not participating in the MP 
(which were assumed to be governed by current harvest control rules). The fact that the 
operator would not be in a position to control the achievement of these OTs through their own 
actions represented a major drawback, and shows that these OTs were inappropriate. It may 
be possible to define achievable stock OTs for this operator by making them relative to catch 
proportions (partial SSB and F). Otherwise, defining stock OTs will either require sufficient 
operator participation to present a clear majority of the catches, or it will not be possible to 
delegate responsibility for achieving such OTs. The OT for Atlantic catfish could not be 
reached, and limited data made it impossible to make stock estimates for tusk and ling. 
The high number of OTs complicated the RBM arrangements, and set high requirements for 
the collection of data for assessment and audit. A smaller set of OTs would have been more 
feasible. The organization representing the majority of the catches did not participate in the 
pilot study, and this was a significant weakness. Hence, this pilot study demonstrated the 
importance of including a good majority of those engaged in the fishery in the MP. 
 
3.3 The Portuguese crustacean bottom trawl fishery 
The DGRM was involved in the initial phase of the pilot study, where the general 
management goals and OTs were defined. Other interest groups, such as consumers’ 
associations, market organizations and NGOs were also involved in this phase. The role of the 
authority was performed by a research group. Assisted by researchers, the operator comprised 
the two most important associations of ship owners involved in the fisheries, i.e. the 




Stakeholders and authorities agreed on the following OTs (Silva et al., 2015): biomass indices 
Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE) >MSY CPUEtrigger for rose shrimp and Norway lobster; reduce 
discards to ≤ 50% in the first five years and to ≤ 25% in the following five years; fishing 
company EBITDA > 0 (average for 10-year period); on board training opportunities provided 
for at least 25 new workers during a 10-year period; establish formal cooperation between 
operators and a scientific institution for improving data collection in order to enhance stock 
assessment and advice.  Performance indicators were defined in the MP to measure the 
success of the strategies used to achieve the OTs and the extent to which they were achieved. 
Depending on the OT, these indicators were to be evaluated in different assessment periods 
during the 10-year MP period. 
Rewards for compliance and good practices as well as sanctions and corrective measures 
concerning observed deviations from the OTs were defined, including fines and temporary 
fishing restrictions. Incentives (fishing days, quota) would encourage the use of selective 
gears and/or bycatch reduction devices.  To ensure proper monitoring of OTs, a 
documentation system was proposed, which included the existing system of electronic 
reporting, more detailed paper logbooks for reporting the retained catches and discards, vessel 
activity information, economic and financial reports, and other arrangements between the 
operators and research institutions to gather data. 
The design and application of the RBM process in the Portuguese crustacean bottom trawl 
fishery was understood by all stakeholders involved. Interaction between Portuguese and 
Spanish operators and scientific research institutes was regarded as a milestone for the 
fishery, and a cross-national PO was proposed to strengthen fishers’ collaboration and market 
influence. The fishery is currently subjected to a high number of detailed regulations, which 
are perceived to be inappropriate. Chiefly, the prospect of developing an alternative to the 
recovery plan for Southern hake and Iberian Norway lobster (EC, 2005) promoted stakeholder 
involvement. 
The implementation of the MP was simulated using a Rule-Based Fuzzy Cognitive Map 
model (Wise et al., 2015). Four different scenarios were simulated corresponding to gear 
modifications aimed at reducing discards. Outcomes regarding Economic (EBITDA) and 
social OTs could not be simulated and effects of a cooperation to improve data collection 




target species and total revenue as a proxy for EBITDA. Results indicated that these OTs 
would be achieved throughout the planning period in most scenarios (Wise et al., 2015).   
Some issues need to be resolved before RBM can be successfully implemented in this fishery. 
In particular, additional incentives must be deployed to encourage operators to participate in 
RBM, and ways to finance the monitoring and auditing processes must be established and 
agreed on (Silva et al., 2015). RBM was well accepted by the operators because clear 
objectives for the crustacean fishery were set. Other positive aspects of the MP development, 
as opposed to the present management regime, included that it implied the same rules for all 
and would replace an unpopular recovery plan. 
 
3.4 North Sea mixed demersal fisheries 
The pilot study was restricted to the Scottish TR1 fleet (trawlers other than beam trawl, with a 
cod-end mesh size > 100 mm) to ensure MP development in consultation with stakeholders 
within a reasonable timeframe. Following the example set by Kerby et al. (2012), using ICES 
Catch Statistics, Scottish fleets were identified as the largest contributor to the North Sea 
landings of demersal finfish species in 2013 (22%) followed by Norway (15%) and the 
Netherlands (12%). Three key agents were identified. The authority was Marine Scotland 
(MS), which is a directorate of the Scottish government, responsible for the promotion of 
sustainable, profitable and well-managed fish resources. The operator was the North East 
group of Scotland Fishermen’s Organisation (NESFO) which represents and assists Scottish 
fishers as catchers and producers. The auditor was Marine Scotland Science (MSS), which 
undertakes research and provides scientific and technical advice on fisheries issues, and is a 
distinct Division of Marine Scotland reviewed by an independent Science Advisory Board.  
Biological, economic and social OTs were identified to address the sustainable exploitation of 
fish stocks, a profitable fishing industry and employment stability. Biological OTs were the 
following species-specific fishing mortalities (F) targeting MSY as defined by ICES (2012): 
Fcod< 0.19, Fhaddock< 0.3, Fwhiting< 0.22 (no FMSY value was defined for whiting and ICES 
(2012) recommended an FTarget of 0.22), Fsaithe< 0.3 and Fhake< 0.24. Fishers were required to 
land all catches of commercial species by 2017. Economic OTs aimed at achieving a 15% 




that the quota share of a single company to be less than 12% and that a minimum of 15% of 
the catch should be sold to local processors (the town of the landing port). 
The MP included new management strategies developed specifically to reach the OTs, 
including the Danish example of catch quota trials (Dalskov and Kindt-Larsen, 2009) but also 
built on existing regulations: skippers in the MP were allocated catch quotas, which were 
slightly higher than the current landing quotas and these could be traded among skippers. 
Remaining quota (attributed to non-active skippers) was administrated by the operator, and 
could be purchased as extra quota by skippers. To facilitate a gradual use of quota as needed 
throughout the year, and to avoid a race to fish, the price of the extra quota would be set by 
the operator at a high level at the start of the year and subsequently decline to reach the actual 
market price at the end of the year. Each year, skippers in the MP must have agreed 
individually with the operator on a fishing plan specifying how they will use their allocated 
quotas for each species throughout the year. These fishing plans took into account the 
seasonality of species, helping the operator foresee related complications such as discards. 
Discards were to be monitored by fully documented fishery schemes as implemented in 
experiments in Scotland and Denmark (Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011). Participating vessels 
should be equipped with a Remote Electronic Monitoring system including winch weight 
sensors and cameras recording catch information on each fishing event. Skippers would have 
equal opportunities to purchase additional quota provided that they follow the obligation to 
land all catches of TAC species. To avoid speculation, a single purchase could not exceed 5% 
of the total available quota.  Skippers were to sell at least 15% of their production to local fish 
processors or markets for local consumption. When committing to sell at least 50% of their 
catches locally, skippers would be selling under a label of locally and sustainably caught fish 
set by the operator in agreement with the authority and regulations in place, which would 
guarantee transparency of the supply chain and reduced carbon emissions from transport, 
potentially granting access to new markets. 
The RBM concept was well received and stakeholders showed interest in being involved in 
MP development. Most of the MP elements proposed by the operator were already in place 
and/or ready to be implemented (e.g. NESFO already trades quotas to provide member 
skippers with additional quota to avoid discarding). Therefore, it would be relatively 
straightforward, in theory, to merge these elements in order to implement RBM. 




showed promise for an actual implementation of RBM. The iteration process as designed by 
RBM performed well: the first MP version was reviewed by the authority (Marine Scotland), 
allowing the operator to address raised issues and improve the MP. The authority and the 
operator came up with constructive ideas about the implementation of RBM without any 
major conflicts between the two agencies. 
The most significant weakness of this pilot study was that it included only a single fleet 
segment of a single country of the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries. A full-scale 
implementation of RBM would be a much more complex given the high number of countries 
and fleet segments involved, and would require that a clear majority of skippers join in and 
abide by the MP. Nonetheless, the cooperation on developing an MP through RBM proved 
rather successful and could be reproduced on a larger scale. Although the operator welcomed 
the RBM concept and their increased involvement in management decisions, concerns were 
raised about the possible lack of incentives (i.e. only slight increases in quotas) for skippers to 
join and commit to the MP since participation is voluntary. While biological and economic 
OTs were widely accepted, criticisms were raised regarding technicalities of the social OTs. 
For instance, the OT stating that 15% of vessels catches should be sold locally was judged 




4.1 Performance of the RBM framework in pilot studies 
The methodology of using artificial planning and evaluation processes to assess the feasibility 
of alternative management arrangements sets constraints for the type of conclusions that can 
be drawn from this study. First, the actors might have displayed different attitudes if the RBM 
was going to be implemented in reality. Second, the pilot studies were limited to the initial 
steps of planning and evaluating the MP, and did not allow simulations of the further process 
of implementing and adapting MPs. Conducted in cooperation with relevant agents, the pilot 
studies nevertheless illustrate potentials and constraints with regard to using RBM as a model 
for an industrial organization approach to co-management.  
Most of the identified relevant operators expressed genuine interest in participating, motivated 




legitimate management system. Most enthusiasm came from cases which had significant 
weaknesses in the current approach (Icelandic lumpfish fishery and the Portuguese case).  
In the Icelandic mixed demersal case, disagreements about allocation issues surfaced in 
relation to NASBO’s proposal of operating a quota bank. This illustrates the importance of 
avoiding that the implementation of any new system, including RBM, is used as an arena for 
arguing about allocation rights. 
The organisation that represented the largest collective share of the Icelandic mixed demersal 
fisheries (LIU), declined to participate. This severely limited the potential of an MP, as 
operators would not be in a position deliver on OTs relating to the whole stock. This case also 
illustrated that in an ecosystem approach, as pursued here, there is a need to avoid too many 
OTs with associated indicators (Jennings, 2005) as this will complicate the MP and 
undermine the scope for flexible and efficient management arrangements.   
As in the previous case, the MP for the North Sea mixed demersal fishery was constrained by 
the fact that the operators represented only about 22% of the total catch. In this case, it would 
be highly challenging to achieve full coverage of the fisheries in question due to the 
international scope of operators, distributed over several countries and speaking different 
languages.  
Except for the North Sea study, a major problem was the lack of participation and support 
from relevant authorities in the pilot studies. In the Icelandic studies, the authorities seemed 
reluctant to participate due to concerns that this would be perceived to reflect approval of 
initiatives that were not established within the existing policy context, and hence exempted 
from democratic accountability. Besides the fact that the pilot studies represented a research 
initiative, with no actual implementation considered, this concern seems unjustified, as RBM 
is designed as an approach to implement existing policies by making their objectives explicit, 
and by delegating responsibility for their achievement. The reluctance of authorities to 
delegate power is well known from other contexts. However, power delegation is necessary to 
allow users to design and implement effective means to achieve required results (Moynihan, 
2006). In general, RBM depends on trust and cooperation between contracting partners, and it 




Finally, in many pilot studies, it proved difficult to define OTs with all required properties: 
relevant, measurable, and achievable through actions taken by the operators. Fitzpatrick et al. 
(2011) argue that outcomes in RBM preferably should be defined in terms of in-situ 
measures, which are directly observable and can be controlled by actions taken on a vessel 
level. However, RBM on organizational level makes it necessary to rely on OTs defined in 
terms of ex-situ measures (e.g. stock indicators). Drawbacks of ex-situ measures include that 
they are not observable in real time and that outcomes are likely to be influenced by external 
factors. The challenges with relying on ex-situ measures will remain when delegating 
responsibility to resource users. Limitations of OTs and systems for information and control 
must be considered when evaluating how operators in RBM can be held to account for 
management outcomes. Operators should not be judged by a higher standard of accountability 
and proof than expected from authorities in an equivalent top-down management system.           
 
4.2 Advantages and drawbacks of the RBM framework 
Different approaches to fisheries governance are underpinned by different rationales and 
values (Gray, 2005). RBM combines advantages from participatory and representative 
governance approaches as public authorities remain in control of the policy setting, while the 
responsibility for management and implementation is conditionally delegated to user groups. 
RBM is aligned with market-based governance as it deploys incentive structures that reward 
operators for innovation and for contributing to the knowledge base for fisheries management. 
The flexibility of the RBM allows operators to improve the cost-efficiency of management 
and implementation strategies as long as they provide adequate documentation and achieve 
OTs in the agreed period. This allows operators to tailor management strategies to comply 
with policy requirements while advancing their own objectives and making use of local 
knowledge and resources. RBM is responsive as its documentation system and audit 
framework allow for timely interventions and adaptive management. The system enhances 
transparency through the public hearing of the MP and publication of the audit report and 
process log. RBM is aligned with cost recovery as it shifts management responsibilities and 
the burden of proof, and the associated costs, to resource users.  
Operators should represent a good majority of the participants in the fishery. This necessitates 
strong incentives, or that RBM is made mandatory. RBM is likely to involve relatively high 




collection and the implementation of management measures (Townsend, 2010a). This 
suggests that voluntary RBM arrangements will only be feasible and worthwhile to pursue for 
operators when they can plan and make decisions for the large majority of the fishery. This 
requires that participants are sufficiently homogenous regarding interests and perspectives to 
enable common planning, which is more likely in simple governance situations (fewer 
nations, gear types, etc.). It is difficult for resource users to manage large-scale, transboundary 
resource systems, as this requires that they cooperate effectively through joint organisations 
(Singleton, 1999). The high costs also imply that voluntary RBM arrangements will be more 
likely to be pursued for resources of high values or large volumes, or for fisheries where a 
large number of fishers are organised by one effective operator. 
Alternatively, authorities may require that resource users develop acceptable management 
plans and document the sustainability of their activities in exchange for access to exploit 
publically owned marine resources. This approach will likely be resisted by the industry 
where access has previously been granted without such obligations. However, the flexibility 
of the RBM framework allows for alternative distributions of resource management 
responsibilities and costs.  
RBM requires that operators develop the necessary organisational capacity and foster 
leadership. For instance, the disagreement between members of operator organizations 
regarding certain OTs illustrates how leadership and approaches to collective decision-making 
become important when resource user organisations are involved in management processes. 
This requires that the organisations develop ways to resolve conflicts, clarify mandates, and 
establish processes to ensure legitimacy of decisions. Operators will initially have limited 
experience and organizational capacity. However, once developed, an increased 
organizational capacity is a generic asset that provides a basis for adapting in response to 
environmental or regulatory change (McClenachan et al., 2015).  
 
5. Conclusions 
The RBM framework presents a model of an ‘industrial organization’ approach to co-
management, distinguished by entrusting operators with new management responsibilities 
specified in relation to the achievement of objectives and documentation requirements. While 




traditional management system to RBM, the responsibility for undertaking most of them 
shifts from the authority to operators and auditors. This, however, represents a significant 
change, which requires that such agents develop new capacities, and that legal and regulative 
frameworks are reconsidered. Our pilot studies suggest that a rapid switch to RBM is unlikely 
to be acceptable to authorities and operators. Therefore, a change to RBM will probably be 
gradual, enabling operators and authorities to develop trust and capacity while the scope of 
mutual responsibilities is specified. The reversal of burden of proof may be phased in, as 
responsibility for tasks of monitoring, documentation and control is transferred. The process 
and the above mentioned issues need to be properly documented when RBM is implemented 
in real life cases to promote learning and allow for further research.  
The factors identified by Ostrom (2009) to enhance the likelihood of achieving sustainable 
social-ecological systems through self-organisation are also relevant here. These suggest that 
RBM is most likely to succeed where resources are well contained, of limited mobility, 
potentially productive, valuable, have predictable dynamics, leadership is effective, there are 
shared values, and there is good knowledge about the fisheries. Some of our case studies had 
these traits but none had them all. European examples of fisheries with all of these traits 
include high value shellfish and some pelagic fisheries.  
Trends towards RBM like arrangements are observed in Europe as stakeholder organizations 
increasingly get involved in management (Hegland and Wilson, 2009; Holmes et al., 2011; 
Stange et al., 2014). Deploying RBM ideas, the 2014 CFP reform aspires to reduce micro-
management and move towards regionalized management, enabling regulations to be adapted 
to specific areas. A new proposal for technical regulations is very much in line with RBM as 
presented here as it is formulated as a generic regulation, which establishes a basis for 
decentralized technical regulations, tailored to achieve policy objectives (EC, 2016). Hence, 
although our research indicates that a full scale RBM is unlikely to be implemented in the 
near future, it is also clear that European fisheries governance is moving in that direction. The 
rock lobster fishers of New Zealand have successfully adopted principles that characterise the 
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